I am currently reading papers from the January 2007 issue of Public Choice, which is fantastic. I hope to blog more details soon. For now, a blug on two new papers.

First, my eminent domain paper with Sasha Totah in The Independent Review. We examine the Kelo backlash and evaluate whether state laws in response tend to strengthen property rights. Where state lawmakers eschew symbolic politics and resist rent protection by those with interests in strong eminent domain powers, property rights will be better enforced after Kelo.

Second, "Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States and Congressional Term Limits," with Todd Jewell in a forthcoming issue of Public Choice. Paper here (subscription required) Abstract:

States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.